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Patent Term Extension provision. In Ortho–McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v.
Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, both decided
in May 2010, the Federal Circuit affirmed term extensions on new
compounds highly related to drugs already approved and in commercial use
in order to compensate for time lost during lengthy Food and Drug
Administration regulatory review. Such decisions signal a shift in the
historically inconsistent Federal Circuit treatment of the statutory term
“product” for purposes of patent-term-extension analysis by easing
extension grants for new drug products highly related to those previously
approved and marketed. This Comment argues that a reversal from the
Federal Circuit’s recent treatment of highly related compounds is necessary
to establish a more beneficial balance between innovation and consumer
protection in the patent regime, and to prevent further manipulation of
Hatch–Waxman provisions.
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INTRODUCTION
The stated purpose of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch–Waxman Act, is “to
make available more low cost generic drugs” and “to create a new incentive
for increased expenditures for research and development,”1 better
motivating drug companies to supply the American public with “the best
medicine that pharmaceutical science can provide.”2 In furtherance of these
goals, the Hatch–Waxman Act seeks to balance the competing interests of
branded pioneer pharmaceutical companies and their generic counterparts in
order to protect the financial interests of the consumer while still fostering
economic incentives to innovate.3
While the Act has generated greater competition in the pharmaceutical
market and provided increased access to low-cost generic alternatives, its
provisions have also been circumvented and manipulated by companies
whose anticompetitive efforts aim to “turn the [A]ct on its head.”4 Brandname pharmaceutical companies employ a number of strategies to extend
their patent lifetimes that abide by the letter of the Hatch–Waxman Act but
not by its spirit, including the initiation of patent infringement suits, reverse
settlement agreements, and the strategic temporal layering of patents over

1

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48.
Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Remarks on
Signing S. 1538 into Law, 20 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1359, 1360 (Sept. 24, 1984) (statement of
President Reagan)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
3
See Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: FineTuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 51, 53 (2003).
4
Henry A. Waxman, Op-Ed., False Alarms on Clean Air, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at A21; see
also Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch–Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or Survival of the
Fittest?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (2002).
2
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different aspects of one drug product.5 A prime example of a new
opportunity for major pharmaceutical companies to “game” the system in
such a manner is the recent treatment of related drug compounds under the
Act’s Patent Term Extension provision.
The Patent Term Extension provision provides up to five additional
years on a patent to compensate for the patent term length and potential
profits lost to the increasingly lengthy period of mandatory Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulatory testing.6 By restoring that portion of
patent life for a pharmaceutical product, the statute aims to boost the
economic incentive for new drug development, a motivation already
diminished to some degree by the immense research-and-development costs
inherent to the pharmaceutical industry.7 Despite its straightforward
underlying purpose, the Patent Term Extension provision has given rise to
inconsistent and controversial rulings as courts have wrestled with the
definition of “product” and its application to highly related drug
compounds.8 Because the extension statute stipulates that the commercial
marketing of the drug after the regulatory review at issue must be the “first
permitted commercial marketing or use of the product,”9 the definition of
“product” is a key determination dictating the validity of an extension. The
word’s definition is particularly problematic in the context of new
pharmaceuticals that are highly structurally related to previously approved
products, such as an approved product’s derivative forms, polymorphs, and
stereoisomeric combinations.10 A broad interpretation of “product” that
includes any derivative form of the active pharmaceutical ingredient such as
salts, esters, or stereoisomeric combinations would foreclose extensions on
5

Melody Wirz, Comment, Are Patents Really Limited to 20 Years?—A Closer Look at
Pharmaceuticals, 1 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 5, at 4 (2003), http://www.okjolt.org/images/pdf/
2003okjoltrev5.pdf (“Patent protection is meant to reward innovation and research. Skillful lawyering or
lobbying should not be rewarded as much as true innovation. However, the loopholes further a policy
that does little to spur new innovation . . . .”).
6
35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006); Behrendt, supra note 4, at 252.
7
Soehnge, supra note 3, at 75 (estimating the cost of a pioneer drug company in bringing a new
drug from research stages to FDA approval to be $500–$600 million in 2001); Mandy Wilson,
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic Favored Legislation May Cause Pioneer Drug
Companies to Pull the Plug on Innovation, 90 KY. L.J. 495, 497 (2001) (citing decreased patent terms,
risk of liability, and increased research costs as factors decreasing the profitability of drug development).
8
See, e.g., Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Lupin Pharm., Inc., 603 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir.
2010); PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372, 1374–76 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
9
§ 156(a)(5)(A).
10
A chemical derivative is a structural analogue that theoretically can be formed from the precursor
compound. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 173 (Richard
Cammack et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (defining “derivative” as “any compound that may, at least
theoretically, be formed from another compound to which it is structurally related”). A stereoisomer is a
molecule that has the same molecular formula and sequence of bonded atoms as another molecule, but
differs only in the three-dimensional orientation of its atoms in space. See INT’L UNION OF PURE &
APPLIED CHEMISTRY, COMPENDIUM OF CHEMICAL TERMINOLOGY: GOLD BOOK 1450 (2012), available
at http://goldbook.iupac.org/PDF/goldbook.pdf.
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any related drug compounds whose parent active ingredient has already
been marketed. If an ester of the drug for which an extension is sought has
already been marketed, the argument goes, its forthcoming commercial
marketing would not be the first marketing of the “product,” and therefore
no extension could be granted.
Conversely, defining “product” narrowly to mean only the exact
chemical structure found in a marketed drug compound would allow a
subsequent derivative to enjoy its own patent extension since that specific
“product” would not have been previously brought to market. With little
statutory guidance, the Federal Circuit has treated the term inconsistently,
endorsing each definition at different times and thus creating an undesirable
element of unpredictability in the Act’s application.11
Specifically, two recent Federal Circuit decisions applying the narrow
interpretation of “product” suggest a break away from the circuit’s previous
approach of limiting the prevalence of term extensions.12 In Ortho–McNeil
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and PhotoCure ASA v.
Kappos, both decided in May 2010, the Federal Circuit shifted to a more
consistent application of the narrower “product” definition.13 The Federal
Circuit allowed patent term extensions in both cases by reasoning that an
enantiomer and methyl ester, respectively, of two previously approved and
marketed drug products were in fact different “products” than their
predecessors already in commercial use.14 These decisions contradict
previous rulings limiting extensions by defining “product” more broadly,15
and instead make it easier for branded pioneer companies to obtain term
extensions over drug compounds highly related to already marketed drugs.
They therefore threaten to tilt the delicate balance in the current patent
regime between branded and generic companies further away from the
consumer interest in low-cost, high-quality pharmaceuticals.16

11

Compare Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding
that the statutory definition of “product” included an active ingredient and its derivatives, such as salts),
and Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 101 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “product”
should be restricted to the particular structure rather than its underlying active ingredient), with Glaxo
Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 399–400 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (construing the term “product” to
mean only the specific structure physically found in the compound, not including any salt, ester, or other
noncovalent derivative of the active ingredient).
12
See William L. Warren et al., Unique Active Ingredient in Drug Product Can Mean Patent Term
Extension, EMERGING ISSUES, May 2010, at 1, 1.
13
Ortho–McNeil, 603 F.3d at 1380–81; PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1374–76.
14
Ortho–McNeil, 603 F.3d at 1381; PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1376.
15
See, e.g., Fisons, 876 F.2d at 101; Pfizer, 359 F.3d at 1366–67.
16
See James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 481 (1986) (“[P]atent
extension and market exclusivity may be costly to consumers, but real increases in future drug
innovation may not follow.”).
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Although a consistent, predictable approach to patent term extensions
is desirable, the Federal Circuit’s current trend towards relaxing termextension grants signals dangerous consequences for a patent system
currently struggling to balance the competing interests of consumers,
branded pharmaceutical companies, and generic manufacturers.17 Indeed,
with anticompetitive incentives already being fostered, albeit inadvertently,
by other provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act, major pharmaceutical
companies are hardly in need of another legislative loophole to exploit in
order to extend patent lifetimes.18 The Federal Circuit should therefore
abandon its current endorsement of a narrow definition of “product” in
favor of its prior line of reasoning where it interpreted the term more
broadly. A broad interpretation of “product” limits the granting of
extensions and better upholds the harmonizing aims of the Hatch–Waxman
Act. This interpretation not only reflects the desired purpose of the termextension provision, but also fosters the desired balance between the
incentive to innovate and the concern for consumer protection in the patent
regime.19
Part I of this Comment introduces the history of the Hatch–Waxman
Act and its patent-term-extension provision. Part II discusses the difficulties
that the ambiguous “product” language within the statute creates for the
courts, and Part III covers the courts’ past disparate treatment of related
drug compounds in the context of term extensions and examines the
rationales behind these inconsistent rulings. Part IV explains the Federal
Circuit’s recent rulings in Ortho–McNeil and PhotoCure ASA and the
implications for future related drug compound cases. Finally, Part V argues
that the shift toward a more liberal granting of extensions represents yet
another opportunity for branded pharmaceutical companies to “game” the
17

Soehnge, supra note 3, at 51 (noting that although the Hatch–Waxman Act was passed to better
balance the intellectual property interests of pioneer drug developers with the need of the American
public for lower cost generic alternatives, the legislation has been circumvented by manufacturers in
ways that “decrease competition in the drug market and, in turn, decrease availability of generic drugs to
the public”).
18
See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 248 (noting that the Act has “prompted . . . rival competitors to
join hands” in anticompetitive agreements); Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, in
4 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 145, 147 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004) (“[T]he major
drug companies have learned to game the system to delay competition, creating a need for a fresh look
at the special Hatch–Waxman provisions that govern pharmaceutical patent infringement litigation.”);
Daniel I. Gorlin, Staving Off Death: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Strategies to Protect
Blockbuster Franchises, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 823, 824–25 (2008) (describing the anticompetitive
strategies employed by AstraZeneca and Schering–Plough in extending the patent terms over Prilosec
and Claritin, respectively); infra Part IV.
19
Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 1, 2 (2005) (“The federal patent system . . . embodies a carefully crafted bargain for
encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful and nonobvious advances in technology . . . in
return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years.” (omissions in original)
(quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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patent system, with harmful consequences for consumer interests. This
Comment argues that a reversal from the recent shift in the Federal Circuit’s
treatment of highly related compounds is necessary to establish a more
beneficial balance between innovation and consumer protection in the
patent regime, and to prevent further manipulation of Hatch–Waxman
provisions.
I.

THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE HATCH–WAXMAN ACT

A. The Pharmaceutical Industry Prior to the Hatch–Waxman Reforms
The Hatch–Waxman Act, the first major piece of federal
pharmaceutical drug legislation enacted since the passage of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA),20 was designed to better
promote generic drug alternatives while still facilitating pioneer drug
research and development.21 The collective discontent felt by both generic
and branded pioneer pharmaceutical companies under the FDCA’s original
statutory framework motivated the passage of the Hatch–Waxman
reforms.22 Pioneer pharmaceutical companies complained that the
regulatory approval process under the FDCA significantly shortened patent
terms and dulled financial incentives to innovate.23 Companies that
manufactured generics, in turn, characterized the Act as unfairly delaying
drug competition to the detriment of the consumer.24 The Hatch–Waxman
Act therefore reflects Congress’s efforts to “balance two conflicting policy
objectives: to induce brand name pharmaceutical firms to make the
investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of
those drugs to market.”25
The FDA played a pivotal role in the regulation of the pharmaceutical
industry under the FDCA framework and continues to do so.26 Empowered
with the authority to review the safety of any new pharmaceutical product
before it could be introduced into commerce, the FDA requires the
manufacturer of a new drug to submit a new drug application (NDA)
20

Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006)).
David J. Bloch, If It’s Regulated Like a Duck . . . Uncertainties in Implementing the Patent
Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 111,
112 (1999) (“A central congressional goal in passing [the Act] was to remedy these distortions.”);
Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch–Waxman Act: History, Structure, and
Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 585 (2003).
22
Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 590.
23
See Wheaton, supra note 16, at 434–35 (describing the lobbying efforts on the part of generics
and branded pharmaceutical companies in the years leading up to the Hatch–Waxman Act of 1984).
24
Id.
25
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Abbott Labs. v.
Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.D.C. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
26
Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 587.
21
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containing studies demonstrating that the product was safe for human use.27
Any unpublished data used in support of an NDA was to be kept
confidential and could not be disclosed or used by another company to
support its own NDA on a similar or identical drug. Through this
protection, the FDA acknowledged the high cost of such testing for branded
companies and the opportunity for generics to benefit at pioneer companies’
expense.28 Therefore, even from its inception in 1938, the FDA was keenly
aware of the tension existing between branded and generic drug companies
stemming from the huge research costs inherent in bringing a
pharmaceutical product into commerce.29
In fact, the Patent Act itself developed from the assumption that a
period of exclusivity is necessary to stimulate the optimal level of
innovation for society.30 The Patent Act establishes within the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) the “power to grant inventors
limited monopolies in exchange for the disclosure of their inventions.”31
After satisfying certain statutory requirements including novelty, utility,
and nonobviousness,32 patent holders are granted the right to prevent others
from using, manufacturing, selling, offering to sell, or importing the
patented product or process.33 For the majority of patents filed on or after
January 1, 1995, the term of protection is twenty years from the date the
application is filed.34 A pioneer drug firm would thus first seek to satisfy the
elements of patentability under the Patent Act during a drug’s development
process, and then meet the safety requirements of the FDCA in order to
bring the product to market.
However, in 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver–Harris Amendments
to the FDCA, requiring not only proof of safety on the part of newly
patented drug products, but also proof of efficacy.35 Prior to these
amendments, a pharmaceutical company was not required to corroborate
any purported health benefits of its products before putting them on the
market, so long as they had been proven safe for human consumption.36 The
27

Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355
(2006)) (detailing the application and approval process for new drugs); see also Pub. L. No. 75-717,
§ 2(p), 52 Stat. 1040, 1041 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)) (defining “new drug”).
28
Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 587.
29
Id.
30
ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 565 (2d ed. 2004).
31
Wilson, supra note 7, at 501.
32
35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2006).
33
Id. § 271.
34
Id. § 154.
35
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-871, 76 Stat. 780 (1962); see Sam Peltzman, An
Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049,
1051 (1973); Wheaton, supra note 16, at 439.
36
Peltzman, supra note 35, at 1051; Wheaton, supra note 16, at 439.
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1962 Amendments, however, added the requirement of “substantial
evidence” of the efficacy of a product’s intended purpose; this requirement
has customarily come to mean that a company must conduct at least two
“adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations” demonstrating a
statistically significant benefit for consumers.37 This efficacy requirement
proved quite costly to pioneer pharmaceutical companies as products stalled
in lengthy regulatory testing. Such delays became a significant financial
drain as years of market exclusivity rights, which companies rely upon to
recoup research-and-development costs, consequently went unexploited.38
This problem developed because in general, innovators secure patent
protection over drug products as early as possible in the development
process so as to prevent competitors from entering the market with the same
drug. However, a patent term begins to toll as soon as the patent is secured
over the product, often before the requisite regulatory testing for market
entry has been completed or even begun. Thus, with the heightened efficacy
requirements instituted in 1962, an increasing number of years of market
exclusivity were wasted in testing.39 One study concluded that the average
13.6 years of patent-protected market exclusivity enjoyed by drug
manufacturers prior to 1962 shrank to an average of only 9.5 years by
1979.40 With the addition of the efficacy requirement, therefore, doubly
burdened pharmaceutical companies saw research-and-development costs
increase while the effective length of the patent terms they enjoyed in the
marketplace simultaneously decreased.41 Indeed, the negative ramifications
of this reduction in patent exclusivity on the overall level of pharmaceutical
innovation resulted in much congressional lobbying throughout the 1970s.42
During this decade the Executive Branch also began to advocate restoring a
longer period of patent exclusivity.43
Pioneer companies were not the only players in the pharmaceutical
market burdened by the pre-Hatch–Waxman regulatory framework. The
effective term-length reduction occasioned by the passage of the 1962
37

Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and WellControlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250, 7250 (May 8, 1970); Weiswasser, supra note 21,
at 588 & n.15 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 7250).
38
See Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 588. Marketing exclusivity is a primary benefit of a patent, as
it allows a patent holder to exclude any other manufacturers from intruding on the market for its product,
and thus represents the opportunity to be the sole beneficiary of any financial gain from the product.
Wheaton, supra note 16, at 434–35 (discussing pioneer companies’ reliance on their period of market
exclusivity to recoup innovation costs).
39
See Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 588.
40
Gorlin, supra note 18, at 826.
41
See id. (describing the FDCA amendments as “significantly shorten[ing] the window of
exclusivity within which manufacturers could recoup their investment”).
42
See Wheaton, supra note 16, at 435.
43
See Gorlin, supra note 18, at 826. Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations formally
supported restoring a term of marketing exclusivity to pharmaceutical patents. Id.

1426

106:1419 (2012)

Reining In Patent Term Extensions

Amendments was also onerous to generic manufacturers, who were now
responsible for proving the efficacy—in addition to the safety—of their
products.44 The generic industry furthermore could not recycle either the
efficacy or safety studies already conducted by their pioneer counterparts on
the originally patented drug they were now seeking to replicate.45 As a
result, the costs of independently proving safety and efficacy in order to
gain FDA approval for an equivalent drug were often prohibitively large for
generic manufacturers, dramatically lessening the economic incentive to
bring a low-cost alternative to market.46
Further stifling generics was the fact that whatever independent studies
a generic manufacturer did opt to perform could only take place after the
pioneer drug went off patent.47 This requirement effectively lengthened the
patent term life of a given drug since generic entry was delayed until both
the patent expired and after independent testing could be completed.48
Consequently, the generic presence in the pharmaceutical marketplace
dwindled drastically.49
By 1984, as a result of the general unwillingness of generic drug
manufacturers to shoulder the cost necessary to achieve FDA approval, only
35% of off-patent products had generic equivalents.50 With generic
competition stifled and the economic incentives for pioneer companies to
develop new medicines dulled by the FDCA’s regulatory scheme,
congressional fears of rising drug costs and decreasing availability of
pharmaceuticals intensified.51
B. The Balancing Provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act
In order to effectively remedy this potential market stagnation,
legislation would have to assuage pioneer manufacturers as well as their
generic competitors in hopes of best serving their common beneficiary: the
American consumer.
Cosponsored by Representative Henry A. Waxman (D-CA) and
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
44

See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 249 (describing the generic industry between 1962 and 1984 as
“not a robust industry” and “not economically profitable”); supra note 35 and accompanying text.
45
See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 249; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch–Waxman Act
and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187–89 (1999).
46
Behrendt, supra note 4, at 249.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 249–50. The Federal Circuit ruled in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. that
the manufacture of a patented product by a generic company for purposes of regulatory testing qualified
as an act of infringement. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This ruling was ultimately overruled by the
passage of the Hatch–Waxman Act, specifically § 271(e)(1). Behrendt, supra note 4, at 250.
49
Behrendt, supra note 4, at 249–50 (noting that these forces led to a “low number of generic drugs
on the market prior to 1984”).
50
Gorlin, supra note 18, at 827.
51
See Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 590.
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Restoration Act of 1984 was drafted with a keen awareness of the
legislative priorities of all three players.52 To address the imbalance between
the patent-exclusivity interests of pioneer drug developers and the marketentry concerns of generics, the Act restored patent protection that was lost
to the profit-stalling FDA regulatory process while relaxing the regulatory
pathway faced by generic drug makers. The Act also incentivized generics
to challenge the validity of current pharmaceutical patents.53 In this way, the
Act aimed to eliminate the statutory distortions affecting both the beginning
and end of a patent term: the regulatory-testing delay prematurely
shortening an awarded patent term before the product even reached the
market, and the delayed entry of generic competition artificially lengthening
the effective patent term even after the patent’s original expiration.54
Due to the legislation’s competing aims, the identity of the true
beneficiary of the Hatch–Waxman provisions is hotly debated—both
generic and pioneer companies claim that Congress more satisfactorily
addressed their counterpart’s interests.55 However, both sides benefit
distinctly from separate provisions of the Act, and it is generally regarded
as successful in achieving its goals of facilitating both generic and pioneer
drug research and development.56
Branded pharmaceuticals benefit most clearly from the patent-termextension provision within § 156 of the Act, which allows for the
lengthening of a patent term to compensate for time lost to regulatory
testing. Specifically, in order to remedy the front-end distortion preventing
pioneer companies from benefiting financially from their product during its
regulatory scrutiny, the Act provides for the extension of patent terms over

52

See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 250 (“[T]he Act . . . was intended to strike a balance between the
competitive and commercial forces in the drug industry, namely balancing the interests of consumers,
the brand-name pharmaceutical industry, and the generic drug industry.”).
53
Soehnge, supra note 3, at 51.
54
Natalie Pous, Shifting the Balance Between Branded and Generic Pharmaceutical Companies:
Amendments to Hatch–Waxman Past, Present, and Future, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 301, 301 (2009).
55
Compare Wilson, supra note 7, at 510–11 (characterizing the generic industry as favored by the
Hatch–Waxman Act to the exclusion of pioneers), with Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of
Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 232–33,
237–38 (2001) (describing pioneer companies as truly benefiting from Hatch–Waxman, in no small part
because of their manipulation of its provisions).
56
Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 586. Regarding the Act’s success in promoting the generic market,
the FTC has reported that the Hatch–Waxman Act promoted growth of the generic drug market from
19% of the total pharmaceutical market in 1984 to more than 47% in 2002. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, at i (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. The Act has also successfully promoted research
and development in the pioneer drug industry; the combined $1.06 billion spent by branded
pharmaceutical companies on research and development of new drug products in 1975 grew to exceed
$49.42 billion in 2010. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 2011
PROFILE 42 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/159/phrma_profile_2011_
final.pdf.
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pharmaceutical products that have been subject to regulatory testing by up
to five years.57
As previously discussed, statutory restrictions permit extension only
for those products subject to regulatory review by a federal authority before
their first commercial marketing or use.58 An application for a patent
extension must be filed within sixty days after the product is approved, and
the sum of the patent extension and the amount of the patent remaining after
the product finishes the regulatory review cannot exceed fourteen years.59
Furthermore, despite pioneer companies’ common practice of “layering” a
series of patents covering different aspects of a single product over time so
that the drug stays perpetually on patent, only one patent per drug may be
extended.60 Any lack of due diligence by a pioneer company that causes
delay in the extension process will also reduce the ultimate term extension
granted.61
Due to the extremely high costs of pharmaceutical research and
development, such additional grants of market exclusivity are highly
advantageous to pioneer drug companies. One study estimated that in 2000,
the cost of bringing a single drug to market was approximately $500 million
and represented twelve to fourteen years of research and development,
making any increase in the period of marketing exclusivity desirable in light
of such an immense investment.62 For example, the extra two years of
exclusivity awarded to the manufacturers of Claritin under the Act
amounted to an extra $5 billion of sales for the branded product.63
57

35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2006). The Patent Term Extension statute states:
The term of a patent which claims a product, a method of using a product, or a method of
manufacturing a product shall be extended in accordance with this section from the original expiration
date of the patent . . . if—
(1) the term of the patent has not expired before an application is submitted under subsection (d)(1)
for its extension;
(2) the term of the patent has never been extended under subsection (e)(1) of this section;
(3) an application for extension is submitted by the owner of record of the patent or its agent and in
accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (d);
(4) the product has been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or
use . . . .
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. § 156(c)–(d)(1).
60
Id. § 156(g)(4); Glasgow, supra note 55, at 234 (describing the layering approach used by pioneer
companies to avoid coming “off patent”).
61
Thomas Chen, Note, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch–Waxman Reform, 93 VA. L.
REV. 459, 464 (2007).
62
David Noonan, Why Drugs Cost So Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 22, 26.
63
See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 253. By taking advantage of other extension provisions in the
Uraguay Round Agreement Act, the Hatch–Waxman Act, and pediatric trials, Schering–Plough
ultimately secured over four years of extended patent protection, amounting to $13 billion in revenue.
Glasgow, supra note 55, at 236.
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Pioneer interests are also furthered by the amendments made to the
FDCA in Title I of the Hatch–Waxman Act concerning the Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) process for generic copies of patented
drugs.64 Under Title I, an ANDA filed by a potential generic competitor
must include information demonstrating that the generic is bioequivalent to
the pioneer, among other requirements.65 The filer of an ANDA must also
certify that the generic drug will not infringe any patents held by the maker
of the pioneer drug, that any patents on the pioneer drug have expired or the
date on which relevant patents will expire, or that the patent on the pioneer
drug is invalid.66 A generic manufacturer’s certification that the pioneer
patent is invalid is known as a “Paragraph IV” challenge. If the generic
company asserts in the ANDA that the generic drug will not infringe
existing patents or that existing patents are invalid, the generic filer must
give notice to the pioneer patentee that the ANDA has been submitted and
include a detailed explanation of his basis for the claim of invalidity or
noninfringement.67
Significantly, if the branded patentee brings an infringement suit
within forty-five days of such notice, Title I prohibits the FDA from
approving the generic ANDA for thirty months from the date of the notice,
unless the trial court decides prior to that time that the patent is invalid or
not infringed.68 Unless the patent litigation concludes in less than thirty
months, unlikely in most federal courts, the patent holder extends his
exclusive market power with the filing of an infringement suit.69 Thus, the
biggest boon the Hatch–Waxman Act provides to branded-pharmaceutical
manufacturers is the opportunity to extend patent lifetimes and thus retain
market exclusivity.
To balance these pro-pioneer interest provisions, the Hatch–Waxman
Act also addresses the back-end distortion artificially lengthening patent
64

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, §§ 101–
106, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585–97 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006)); see also
Wheaton, supra note 16, at 458–59.
65
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). According to the FDA’s definition, “[f]or two orally administered
drug products to be bioequivalent, the active drug ingredient or active moiety in the test product must
exhibit the same rate and extent of absorption as the reference drug product.” CTR. FOR DRUG
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE
STUDIES FOR ORALLY ADMINISTERED DRUG PRODUCTS—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2003),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/ucm070124.pdf; see also Donald J. Birkett, Generics—Equal or Not?, 26 AUSTRALIAN
PRESCRIBER 85, 85 (2003) (“Two pharmaceutical products are bioequivalent if they are
pharmaceutically equivalent and their bioavailabilities (rate and extent of availability) after
administration in the same molar dose are similar to such a degree that their effects, with respect to both
efficacy and safety, can be expected to be essentially the same.”).
66
§ 355(j)(A)(2)(vii); see also Wheaton, supra note 16, at 459 & n.132.
67
§ 355(j)(2)(B).
68
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see also Wheaton, supra note 16, at 460.
69
Wheaton, supra note 16, at 460–61.
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terms to the detriment of generics. Title II of the Hatch–Waxman Act70
makes it clear that the manufacture or use of a patented product “solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information”
to the FDA is not an act of infringement.71 Generics are thereby empowered
by the Act to begin testing their replication of a branded product before the
expiration of its patent, directly overturning the ruling in Roche Products,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.72 The regulatory testing allowance within
this provision is unique to the field of pharmaceutical patents; no other
patent holder is denied the right to exclusive use of her patented invention
during the actual term of the patent without her consent, as through a
licensing scheme.73 Furthermore, the Act reduces the generic’s burden of
proof in its testing requirements to a standard of bioequivalence with the
patented target.74 Thus, rather than satisfy separate safety and efficacy tests,
a generic manufacturer only needs to prove that its drug contains the same
active ingredient and basic pharmacokinetics of the branded product it
imitates.75 Beyond this showing, the generic manufacturer may freely rely
upon the safety and efficacy studies performed by the patent holder, thus
eliminating duplicative research costs and ultimately bringing generic
alternatives to market more quickly and cheaply.76
The simplified ANDA process also encourages generics to challenge
patented products with the reward of a 180-day exclusivity advantage over
any other generic manufacturers for successful invalidity claims.77 The drug
application process outlined in the Act provides that the holder of any
approved NDA must list pertinent pharmaceutical patents it believes would

70

Pub. L. No. 98-417, §§ 201–203, 98 Stat. 1598, 1598–1603 (1984) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 271).
71
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006); see Bloch, supra note 21, at 120.
72
733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute, § 271(e)(1); see also Wilson, supra note 7,
at 509–10 (describing Title II’s reversal of the holding in Roche that a generic company’s use of a
patented product to perform the FDA required testing to bring a bioequivalent drug to market was
infringement).
73
See Wilson, supra note 7, at 509–10; Susan Kopp Keyack, The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Is It a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 147, 160–
61 (1989) (“[S]ection 271(e)(1) offsets the benefits gained by the pioneer manufacturers from the patent
extension provisions.”).
74
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
75
Chen, supra note 61, at 463. An active ingredient is the chemical compound that produces the
drug’s intended therapeutic effect, in contrast to inactive ingredients used for color or flavor. See Huba
Kalász & István Antal, Drug Excipients, 13 CURRENT MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 2535, 2535 (2006).
“Pharmacokinetics” is defined as “the study of the action of drugs within the body, which can, in many
respects, be envisioned more accurately as the actions of the body on an administered drug. It includes
studies of the mechanisms of drug absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion; onset of action;
duration of effect; biotransformation; and effects and routes of excretion of the metabolites of the drug.”
MOSBY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING & HEALTH PROFESSIONS 1439 (8th ed. 2008).
76
See Chen, supra note 61, at 464.
77
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Pous, supra note 54, at 304–05.

1431

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

be infringed if a generic version of its drug entered the market before the
expiration of each patent.78 The FDA maintains a list of all its approved
pharmaceuticals in a publication titled Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the “Orange
Book.”79 Subsequent ANDAs filed by generics seeking to replicate the drug
in question must reference these Orange Book patents and make one of four
“certifications” for each patent.80
The amended ANDA process benefits generics by giving them a
unique incentive to challenge patents’ validity: successful Paragraph IV
litigation proving invalidity or noninfringement rewards the generic
manufacturer with a 180-day marketing exclusivity period, during which
time the FDA is prohibited from approving any other generic versions of
that drug.81 This 180-day period of exclusivity constitutes immense profit
potential and handsomely rewards the first generic manufacturer who takes
the risk of a Paragraph IV challenge. The incentive to challenge patents
further promotes consumer interests by creating a “patent-quality oversight
mechanism” that accelerates the provision of generic alternatives to
market.82
Therefore, the provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act alternate their
focus between the interests of generics and branded companies. They serve
the Act’s ultimate harmonizing purpose of maintaining economic incentives
for both pioneer research and development and affordable generic
alternatives.83 Branded interests benefit from the new statutory potential to
extend market exclusivity through both a term extension under § 156 and a
thirty-month stay under the revamped ANDA process.84 Generics, in
contrast, benefit from the reversal of the Roche ruling and the
corresponding easing of regulatory testing standards, as well as the 180-day
exclusivity grant to the first successful Paragraph IV challenger of a
patented product.85 These special concessions to the pharmaceutical
industry have prompted criticism of the Act, which contrasts the generally
rigid application of the patent regime over other industries’ innovation
interests. Arguably, however, the unique aspects of the pharmaceutical

78

§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); see also note 66 and accompanying text.
CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (32d ed. 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf; see also Pous, supra note 54, at
304–05.
80
See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV); Pous, supra note 54, at 305.
81
Chen, supra note 61, at 465.
82
Id.
83
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48.
84
See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Wheaton, supra note 16, at 465–66; supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85
See Chen, supra note 61, at 465; see also Wheaton, supra note 16, at 458.
79
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industry—including its immense research-and-development costs as well as
the social value of its products—make such special provisions necessary.86
The patent system as a whole and the limited monopolies it grants are
usually justified by reference to their use in promoting and stimulating
research and invention. The biopharmaceutical industry, necessitating
unusually intensive investments of time and capital, therefore seems a
worthy subject for unique treatment by the system.87 Highlighting the
pharmaceutical industry as an outlier in terms of research costs, a 2006
study by the Congressional Budget Office found that pharmaceutical firms
invest as much as five times more in research and development relative to
sales than the average U.S. manufacturing firm.88 Indeed, it has been
estimated that the pharmaceutical industry’s research-and-development
costs for the year 2003 were over $17 billion, representing an average
increase of 5% per year in real terms since 1980.89 A widely cited 2003
study further estimated that the average cost of successfully developing a
new drug, including the indirect costs incurred by a firm through spending
on failed drug projects, was $802 million in the year 2000.90 The
pharmaceutical industry as a whole estimates it spent $49.4 billion on
research and development in 2010 alone.91
With the average time period necessary to develop a new drug
hovering at approximately twelve years,92 the opportunity cost of such an
investment escalates as firms’ time and resources are rerouted from other
projects.93 Such dramatic economic statistics bolster the argument that the
pharmaceutical industry warrants special treatment by the U.S. patent
system due to its unique cost challenges. Without an adequate economic
incentive to innovate, such as a substantial period of marketing exclusivity,
major pharmaceutical players would surely exit the market, resulting in

86

Wilson, supra note 7, at 509–10 (discussing how § 271(e)(1) is unique to the pharmaceutical
industry because all other patent holders are entitled to exclusive use of their patented product for the
full length of the patent term, and therefore contributes to the dulling of the incentive to innovate new
pharmaceuticals).
87
Alijalian, supra note 19, at 2–3 (quoting Abraham Lincoln as describing the patent system as
“add[ing] the fuel of interest to the fire of genius” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
88
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 9
(2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugrd.pdf.
89
Id. at 7–8 (quoting National Science Foundation estimates).
90
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs,
22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003).
91
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 56. In fact, the Obama Administration recently
pledged $1 billion towards a national drug development center due to concerns that rising research costs
will slow the pace of pharmaceutical innovation. See Gardiner Harris, A New Federal Research Center
Will Help to Develop Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at 1.
92
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 2, 31.
93
DiMasi, supra note 90, at 152.
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fewer new and improved drug products.94 This cost-deterrent argument not
only justifies specialized treatment for pioneer companies but also for their
generic imitators, as illustrated by the substantial decline in the number of
generic products brought to market after the enactment of the 1962 FDCA
Amendments.95 As previously discussed, the substantial costs of replicating
the efficacy and safety tests performed on a branded drug compound were
simply prohibitively large for many generic companies to enter the market
competitively.96 Therefore, from a pure cost-of-innovation standpoint, a
convincing argument emerges justifying the exclusive tailoring of the
Hatch–Waxman Act for the pharmaceutical industry because of its high
research costs.
In addition to this economic justification, a more policy-driven
argument can be made for specialized treatment of the pharmaceutical
industry given the high social value of the products it develops.97 While the
U.S. patent system exists by virtue of Congress’s general power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries,”98 the
high social utility of the pharmaceutical industry’s products justifies its
disparate treatment among the other useful arts and sciences.
Indeed, congressional concern over the complex interplay of the profit
motives of firms, immense research-and-development costs, and consumer
demand for high quality, lower cost medicines motivated the passage of the
Hatch–Waxman Act in 1984.99 As articulated by Senator Hatch, “With the
stakes so high, it is imperative that our intellectual property laws provide
the proper incentives to facilitate a new era in our understanding of human
biology, health, and disease.”100 Thus, both economic-incentive
considerations and a more theoretical championing of the high social utility
of the pharmaceutical industry’s products justify its disparate treatment
within the patent regime. However, it remains an important check on the
pro-innovation provisions of the Hatch–Waxman system that, to the

94

Wilson, supra note 7, at 496 (“Diminishing the effective patent term will reduce the incentive to
develop pioneer drugs and may result in fewer new and improved medications.”).
95
Gorlin, supra note 18, at 827.
96
Id. (noting, as evidence of the prohibitive nature of these costs, that by the early 1980s nearly 150
post-1962 off-patent drugs were without generic competition).
97
Wilson, supra note 7, at 516 (recognizing the need for adequate patent protection to spur drug
innovation by stating that “[s]ociety has patent terms to thank for the availability of beneficial new
drugs”).
98
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
99
See Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent
Settlements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3–4 (2001) (statement of Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
100
Id. at 4.
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American consumer, “an unaffordable medication may be the same as no
medication at all.”101
II. DEFINING “PRODUCT” IN THE HATCH–WAXMAN ACT
The inherent tension between pioneer and generic companies’ interests
therefore underlies much of the Hatch–Waxman legislation, despite its
creators’ best efforts to balance the ultimate benefits each industry enjoys.
The inconsistent application of the patent-term-extension statute reflects the
continuing struggle between generic and pioneer interests as courts wrestle
with the proper meaning of “product.”102 Although the consistency of the
recent Federal Circuit trend favoring extensions is desirable, a return to the
court’s previous line of reasoning defining “product” to rein in extensions
on related compounds is necessary to protect the balance between generics
and pioneers.103
Section 156 states that an extension shall be granted if, among other
requirements: “the product has been subject to a regulatory review period
before its commercial marketing or use . . . [and] the permission for the
commercial marketing or use of the product after such regulatory review
period is the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the product.”104
It is unsurprising that the “product” definition has posed such a stumbling
block for the Federal Circuit over the years, given the ambiguity of the
deceivingly simple term in both a legal and scientific sense. Section 156
defines “product” vaguely as “[a] drug product,”105 a clarification that is “far
from enlightening.”106 The statute then defines “drug product” as “the active
ingredient of . . . a new drug . . . including any salt or ester of the active
ingredient.”107 While this definition is an improvement on the previous one,
it too lacks the requisite specificity to give it true utility because “active
ingredient” is also a term riddled with ambiguity.108
In a general chemical sense, an “active ingredient” is the component of
a drug compound that provides the biological activity that causes an effect

101

Id. at 3.
Paul Burgess & John Lucas, Which Generic Drug Would You Want to Use? The Federal
Circuit’s Interpretation of “Active Ingredient,” “Active Moiety” and “Approved Product,” 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 26 (2005) (concluding that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Pfizer v. Dr.
Reddy’s was an “unfortunate failure to settle a legal uncertainty [that] may result in even greater
litigation in a field already plagued”).
103
For examples of the Federal Circuit’s previous, extension-limiting treatment of the term
“product,” see, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and
Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 101 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
104
35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4)–(5)(A) (2006).
105
Id. § 156(f)(1)(A).
106
Burgess, supra note 102, at 17.
107
§ 156(f)(2).
108
See Burgess, supra note 102, at 17.
102
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on a structure or function of the body.109 Without the active ingredient, the
drug compound would not have the desired effect on a patient. This concept
of active ingredient is also referred to as the “active moiety” of the drug,
meaning the “molecule or ion responsible for the physiological or
pharmacological action of the drug substance.”110 An “active moiety” view
of active ingredient is concerned only with the main molecule causing the
desired effect within the body, rather than the generic salt or ester
characteristics appended to it.111
In contrast, others conceive of “active ingredient” as referring to the
approved product as it exists in the actual drug compound. This definition
includes any variation on the main, pharmacological-effect-producing
molecule itself.112 If this molecule were formulated as one of its salt forms
in the approved drug compound, under this view the active ingredient
would be the salt form itself and not just the underlying parent compound at
the root of that salt formulation.113 In this way, this definition of “active
ingredient” isolates “product” to mean only the specific structure, derivative
form and all, found within the drug compound. In contrast, under the
previous definition linking “active ingredient” with “active moiety,”
“product” would encompass both a salt and ester formulation of the main,
pharmacological-effect-producing molecule. Different packaging as various
derivative forms would not exclude these formulations from the umbrella
“product” classification.
Pioneer and generic interests usually divide predictably in their
preferences for one definition over the other. Pioneers have a strong
financial interest in lengthening their patent terms through extensions.114
Therefore, a pioneer company seeking to gain an extension over a drug
whose ester derivative has already been patented and marketed individually
would advocate for the narrow interpretation isolating “product” to the
specific derivative structure at hand. In contrast, a generic firm seeking to
block a pioneer product from gaining a term extension will seek to
challenge the extension by arguing that “product” should be interpreted
broadly to cover the underlying active ingredient under the “active moiety”
definition.
The Federal Circuit has adopted both definitions at different times,
creating much uncertainty and unnecessary litigation regarding the
109

See Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/informationondrugs/
ucm079436.htm (last visited July 26, 2012).
110
Burgess, supra note 102, at 17.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
See id.
114
Wilson, supra note 7, at 496 (“A secure patent term provides an incentive for pioneer drug
manufacturers to spend money on new and better medications because it increases the probability that a
profit can be made after the large research and development costs are recovered.”).
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suitability of extension grants over particular compounds.115 In doing so, the
Federal Circuit has at times deferred to the FDA and USPTO’s readings of
“product,” and at other times rejected these agencies’ argued expertise
regarding the term’s definition.116 The court has similarly contradicted itself
in its interpretations of the statute’s “plain language.” In one case, it held
that reading “product” to mean only the approved formulation or one of its
esters or salts conflicted with the plain meaning of § 156, and in a later case
ruled that the plain meaning of “product” within the statute could not be
expanded beyond the approved product’s active ingredient, or an ester or
salt thereof.117 The Federal Circuit’s inconsistent treatment of related
compounds in the patent-term-extension context therefore reflects the
court’s struggle concerning its position on the generic and pioneer debate at
the heart of the Hatch–Waxman Act.
III. PAST TREATMENT OF RELATED COMPOUNDS IN THE HATCH–WAXMAN
REGIME
A primary example of the line of reasoning the Federal Circuit
endorsed before the recent Ortho–McNeil and PhotoCure decisions can be
seen in Fisons plc v. Quigg.118 The plaintiff in Fisons appealed the
USPTO’s denial of his patent-term-extension application on a new humandrug product containing cromolyn sodium as its active ingredient.119 Fisons
argued that the denial was based on an incorrect interpretation of “product”
under § 156, leading to the extension denial because of the prior presence of
a highly related drug on the market.120 The court affirmed the denial,
reasoning that Fisons’s interpretation of “product” construed the statutory
term too narrowly to comply with the plain meaning of the statute, and thus
adopted the active moiety view of “product.”121

115

Compare Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 100–01 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (adopting the “active
moiety” definition of product), with Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 397–98 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (adopting the “approved product” reading of product within the statute).
116
Compare Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Lupin Pharm., Inc., 603 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (declining to adopt defendant Lupin’s interpretation of “product” as it “would change the longstanding term-extension policy of the FDA and the PTO”), with Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 399 (“Consequently,
we will give great deference to the Commissioner’s determinations as to which patented chemical
compounds fall within Congress’ definition of ‘products,’ but little or no deference to the
Commissioner’s surmise of Congress’ intent in framing its definition.”).
117
Compare Fisons, 876 F.2d at 101 (“Fisons’ proposed interpretation [reading product as the
approved drug compound only] conflicts with the plain meaning of the statutory language.”), with
Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 395 (stating that the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of the term
“product” meant active ingredient or salts or esters thereof only (internal quotation marks omitted)).
118
Fisons, 876 F.2d at 101 (rejecting the plaintiff’s reading of the statute limiting “product” to only
that drug form actually found in the approved product).
119
Id. at 100.
120
Id. at 100–01.
121
Id. at 101.
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Under such an interpretation, Fisons’s new drug compounds did not
qualify as the first permitted commercial marketing of their common active
ingredient cromolyn sodium, thereby foreclosing the availability of the term
extension.122 Fisons argued that this reading of “product” was erroneous and
should be substituted for an understanding equating “product” with the
particular drug formulation that had been approved.123 Fisons cited the last
sentence of § 156(a), which states: “The product referred to in paragraphs
(4) and (5) is hereinafter in this section referred to as the ‘approved
product.’”124 The plaintiff argued that “product” within the previous
paragraphs of § 156 must refer to the entire composition of the drug
product, not just the active ingredient, because the product is “approved” in
its entirety and not just as an active ingredient.125
The court found Fisons’s interpretation too convoluted to
harmoniously exist with the plain language of the statute, pointing out that
the supposedly clarifying statement introducing the phrase “approved
product” was followed by, not preceded by, the relevant first commercial
marketing requirement.126 Per the court’s opinion, “[i]t would do violence to
the plain language [of § 156] to make the last sentence into a substantive
definition to be read back into paragraph (5). . . . Accordingly, we cannot
agree with Fisons’ position.”127 The extension was accordingly denied, and
the Federal Circuit formally endorsed the definition of “product” that
describes the term as the underlying active ingredient of the drug
compound.128
However, just one year later the court followed Fisons’s unsuccessful
argument in Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, affirming a patent
extension over the antibiotic cefuroxime axetil.129 Cefuroxime axetil is a
derivative ester form of cefuroxime, an organic acid. Cefuroxime and its
salts were claimed in a patent owned by Glaxo, but only two salts were
FDA-approved and ultimately marketed under the names Zinacef and
Kefurox. The parent acid molecule cefuroxime was never approved by the
FDA.130 The USPTO Commissioner denied Glaxo’s application for a patent
term extension over cefuroxime axetil, the ester of cefuroxime, explaining
that its marketing was not the first permitted commercial marketing or use
of the “product” because Zinacef and Kefurox, salts of cefuroxime, had

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
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previously been approved.131 Therefore, according to the Commissioner, the
correct definition of “product” was the underlying active ingredient
cefuroxime—the active moiety of the drug compound. This interpretation
of “product” followed the reasoning of the majority in Fisons.132
Glaxo appealed this decision, arguing that “product” was properly
defined as the specific formulation of the approved drug product,
cefuroxime axetil, and not the parent active moiety, cefuroxime. To support
its position, Glaxo noted that “product” is defined in § 156(f)(2) as “the
active ingredient of a new drug . . . including any salt or ester of the active
ingredient.”133 Neither Zinacef nor Kefurox contains cefuroxime axetil or a
salt or ester of cefuroxime axetil as an active ingredient; these previously
marketed drugs are salts of cefuroxime itself.134 Accordingly, Glaxo argued
that its patent represented the “first permitted commercial marketing or use”
of the “product” cefuroxime axetil, and was deserving of a term
extension.135
The Commissioner asserted that Congress intended the definition to
mean any “new chemical entity” or “new active moiety,” encompassing all
salt or ester forms of a single therapeutically active ingredient.136 This
interpretation better facilitates the introduction of generic drugs to the
marketplace, a primary goal of the Hatch–Waxman Act, and has
furthermore been adopted by the FDA in its own interpretations of Title I of
the Act.137 While acknowledging that Zinacef and Kefurox themselves are
not salts or esters of cefuroxime axetil itself, the Commissioner based his
argument against extension on the nevertheless highly related nature of the
compound cefuroxime.138
The Federal Circuit ultimately disagreed with the Commissioner’s
characterization of “product” and reversed his decision prohibiting the term
extension, now endorsing the narrower “product” definition.139 Although the
court agreed that the Commissioner’s interpretation of § 156 was consistent
with the general purpose of the Act to increase generic availability while
still maintaining economic incentives to innovate, the court adhered to the
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Id.
See Fisons, 872 F.2d at 101.
133
Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 394 (omission in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(2) (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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See id.
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Id. at 394–95.
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Id. at 394.
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Id. at 395–96.
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See id. at 394 (“It is undisputed that cefuroxime axetil is the active ingredient of CEFTIN
tablets. Moreover, the Commissioner does not appear to contest that ZINACEF and KEFUROX are
neither salts nor esters of cefuroxime axetil.”).
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Id. at 399–400.
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literal meaning of the statute, reasoning that the means through which the
goals of the Act were to be achieved was a query for Congress.140
Finally, the court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that his
interpretation was due deference if it was “reasonable” and not clearly
contrary to Congress’s intent.141 Ironically, the “plain meaning” the court
saw as so unambiguous as to justify this lack of agency deference is the
opposite of the “plain meaning” it found the statute to possess in Fisons.142
In Fisons, the Federal Circuit found the plain meaning of § 156(a)(5)’s
reference to “product” to be the underlying active ingredient rather than the
specific formulation found in the approved product; here, the court found
the plain meaning of “product” to be the specific derivative form of the
underlying active moiety found in the approved product.143 With little
explanation given as to why it was now using a different interpretation, the
court dismissed the Commissioner’s remaining arguments as policy
concerns best left to Congress.144
This conflict of precedent was further convoluted with the decision in
Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.145 Pfizer received a patent term
extension on its patent for the drug amlodipine besylate, while Dr. Reddy’s
Laboratories had applied for a patent for amlodipine maleate, a different salt
form of the underlying active moiety amlodipine.146 Pfizer subsequently
sued Dr. Reddy’s, claiming that Dr. Reddy’s amlodipine maleate patent
would infringe Pfizer’s patent on amlodipine besylate.147 Dr. Reddy’s
countered by asserting that the term extension covered only the approved
formulation of the active ingredient present in the marketed compound—
amlodipine besylate—and that its patent on amlodipine maleate did not
infringe.148
This case presented the Federal Circuit with the same question posed in
Glaxo and Fisons: what is the meaning of “product” within § 156?
According to its stance in Glaxo, “product” refers to the approved
140

See id. at 396 (“The Commissioner merely argues . . . that fewer patents should be eligible for
extensions than the plain meaning of that section suggests, and that his interpretation attains a better
balance between the competing purposes of the Act. Congress, however, may decide, and here clearly
did decide, how to best accommodate the conflicting objectives.”).
141
Id. at 398–99 (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
142
Compare Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 395, with Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 101 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
143
Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 395; Fisons, 876 F.2d at 101.
144
Burgess, supra note 102, at 20 (“Without any explanation as to why the term active ingredient
should mean ‘approved product’ rather than ‘active moiety’ the [Glaxo] court found that the statutory
terms had a plain meaning. . . . The court made it clear that ‘striking balances in legislative language is
Congress’ job’ not the court’s.” (quoting Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 395, 399)).
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Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
146
Id. at 1363–64.
147
See id.
148
Burgess, supra note 102, at 16.
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formulation of the active ingredient actually found in the drug compound,
or an ester or salt thereof. Therefore, the term extension would only cover
amlodipine besylate or a salt or ester of amlodipine besylate (none of which
implicate amlodipine maleate) and Dr. Reddy’s patent would not infringe.
However, according to the reasoning articulated in Fisons, “product” refers
to the underlying active moiety regardless of its derivative form. Therefore,
the term extension would cover amlodipine and any salts or esters thereof,
including amlodipine maleate and making Dr. Reddy’s guilty of
infringement.149 Thus, Pfizer presented the court with a chance to
definitively settle the definition of “product” between the two
interpretations, whose differences held drastically different consequences
for the application of the provision.150
The district court ruled that the proper § 156 interpretation aligned
“product” with the specific formulation of the active ingredient found in the
approved product, and accordingly dismissed the infringement charge.151
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and ruled that the
patent term extension applied to the underlying active moiety and all salt
and ester forms, thus covering Dr. Reddy’s maleate form.152 In reaching this
decision, the Federal Circuit was guided by the general purpose of the
Hatch–Waxman Act: “to benefit makers of generic drugs, research-based
pharmaceutical companies, and not incidentally the public.”153 Cognizant of
the benefit the patent-term-extension provision conveys to branded
companies, the court ultimately reasoned that the “product” in this case was
amlodipine, regardless of the salt or ester derivative form.154
In ruling that “product” referred to the underlying active moiety
amlodipine, the court returned to the definition of “product” as referring to
the active ingredient of the product, or any salt or ester of that active
ingredient.155 The court appeared to be swayed by Pfizer’s argument that
changing the derivative form of the drug compound does not affect the
therapeutically active agent, which is the same amlodipine, whether
formulated as the salt amlodipine maleate or fellow salt amlodipine
besylate.156 To allow Dr. Reddy’s to narrowly define the relevant “product”
of Pfizer’s extension as amlodipine besylate and to thereby escape an
149

Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
151
See Patent Term Extension Is Held to Include the Active Ingredient of the Drug Product and All
of Its Salts and Esters Under the Hatch–Waxman Act, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 765, 766 (2004).
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See Pfizer, 359 F.3d at 1366–67.
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Id. at 1364 (quoting Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
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Id. at 1366.
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Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(2) (2006) (“The term ‘drug product’ means the active ingredient of—
(A) a new drug, antibiotic drug, or human biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act) . . . .”).
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See Pfizer, 359 F.3d at 1365.
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infringement charge on amlodipine maleate would be to ignore the foresight
of the legislation’s drafters, who clearly anticipated potential manipulation
of the salt or ester form of an active ingredient in order to dodge this
caveat.157
While this case may at first appear to be a successful attempt to settle
the inconsistent rulings of past term-extension disputes, it fails to
conclusively define “product” for purposes of future extensions.158 The case
fails to make any mention of its earlier, opposite take on the definition of
“product” within Glaxo, an omission which proves problematic since both
the Glaxo and Pfizer decisions were made by three-judge panels.159 The
Federal Circuit declined the opportunity to settle the “product” issue
definitively with an en banc ruling.160 Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s ruling
in Pfizer left Glaxo still standing as precedent, perpetuating overall
uncertainty regarding the meaning of “product.”161
IV. THE RECENT TREND TOWARD EASING EXTENSIONS: ORTHO–MCNEIL
AND PHOTOCURE
With these inconsistent rulings as a backdrop, the Federal Circuit
recently reexamined the definition of “product” in two separate cases,
ultimately granting extensions in both.162 In PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos and
Ortho–McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. the
Federal Circuit held that new active ingredients which were separately
patentable and subject to regulatory review satisfied the § 156 requisite as
the first permitted commercial marketing of the drug product despite highly
related compounds already existing on the market.163 These cases represent
a shift in the Federal Circuit’s treatment of such compounds and seem to
facilitate extension grants. They have dangerous implications for the
already fragile balance between generics and pioneers crafted by the Hatch–
Waxman Act.164
157

Id. As the court stated, “The statute foresaw variation in the salt or ester of an active ingredient,
and guarded against the very loophole now urged.” Id. at 1366 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i), (v)
(2006); 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)).
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Burgess, supra note 102, at 26.
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See id. at 25–26 (“Under the rules of procedure, a three judge panel may not overturn a prior
three judge panel decision.”); see also FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1) (stating that en banc rehearings may be
ordered when “necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decision”).
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Burgess, supra note 102, at 26.
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Id.
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See Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Lupin Pharm., Inc., 603 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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See Ortho–McNeil, 603 F.3d at 1378; PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1377.
164
Warren, supra note 12, at 3 (“These holdings . . . may provide opportunities for patentees to
extend patent term for new drug products . . . even if the drug candidates are related as polymorphs,
protected forms, and different stereoisomeric combinations of a previously patented and approved
product.”).
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In PhotoCure, the chemical entity at issue was methyl aminolevulinate
hydrochloride (MAL hydrochloride), a methyl ester of the known
compound aminolevulinic acid hydrochloride (ALA hydrochloride).165 Both
are used to treat precancerous skin growths, though MAL hydrochloride
achieved separate patentability due to its improved therapeutic properties
and was subject to its own regulatory testing requirements, a process which
erased four-and-a-half years of its patent term.166 The plaintiff applied to the
USPTO for a patent term extension, which the agency denied, ruling that
MAL hydrochloride was the “same ‘product’” as ALA hydrochloride by
virtue of the shared “underlying [ALA] molecule.”167 Because a product
containing ALA hydrochloride was already commercially available, the
FDA’s marketing approval of the MAL hydrochloride product was not the
first commercial use of that “product,” and therefore the plaintiff’s
application failed to meet the statutory requirements for an extension.168
This ruling was supported by the FDA, who had advised the USPTO
that MAL hydrochloride was an ester of the previously FDA-approved
ALA hydrochloride, and proposed that the requirements of § 156 were not
met.169 The district court, however, was unmoved by the line of reasoning
endorsed by these two agencies and granted the extension as it found that
the “product” within the drug at issue was MAL hydrochloride and not the
parent ALA hydrochloride.170 As a result, the USPTO and district court
once again found themselves on opposite sides of the “product” definition
debate, with the USPTO supporting an “active moiety” definition and the
district court looking to the actual formulation present in the approved
product.
The Federal Circuit sided with the district court, adopting the strict
“product” interpretation instead of the “active moiety” theory. The court
was especially persuaded by the fact that MAL hydrochloride qualified as a
separately patentable drug warranting its own regulatory testing, despite the
similarity of its chemical structure to the already marketed ALA
hydrochloride.171 The court also appeared to adopt the reasoning proffered
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PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1374.
See id. at 1374–75.
167
In re Patent Term Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. 6,034,267, 2008 WL 5598280, at
*3, *6 (Comm’r Pat. May 13, 2008) (“ALA is simply formulated differently in the two different
drugs . . . .”).
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PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1375.
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See id. The USPTO had consulted with the FDA in accordance with the Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Patent and Trademark Office and the Food and Drug Administration,
52 Fed. Reg. 17,830 (May 12, 1987), when making its term extension decision.
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PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1375–76.
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Id. at 1375.
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in Glaxo: that “a compound can only qualify as the ‘active ingredient’ of a
drug if that compound itself is present in the drug.”172
The court distinguished Glaxo and the present case from Pfizer by
emphasizing that Pfizer dealt with the scope of a term extension rather than
an issue of extension eligibility.173 The court read Pfizer as standing for the
principle that an extension “was not intended to be defeated by simply
changing the salt,” when the changed salt left the “active moiety” of the
product unchanged.174 Pfizer did not conflict with the Glaxo ruling because
Pfizer did not deal with a molecule of separate patentability.175 Therefore,
the court returned to the line of reasoning it adopted in Glaxo and similarly
granted the term extension over the drug in question, despite its highly
related nature to an already marketed drug.176
In Ortho–McNeil, the Federal Circuit continued in this vein, again
allowing an extension over a derivative form of a known compound.177 The
drug product in Ortho–McNeil was levofloxacin, a single enantiomer of a
known racemic mixture, ofloxacin, a known antibacterial agent.178
Levofloxacin’s manufacturer, Ortho–McNeil, secured a patent for the
enantiomer based upon its superior therapeutic ability and applied for an
extension to compensate for regulatory delay.179 The USPTO, with the
support of the FDA, granted the extension, relying on the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of “product” as articulated in Glaxo.180 Defendant Lupin
initiated Paragraph IV litigation, stipulating to the validity, enforceability,
and infringement of the levofloxacin patent, but contesting whether it was
entitled to the term extension.181 The district court affirmed the extension,
relying on the Glaxo precedent and citing the “great deference” due the
USPTO in regards to “product” determinations.182
172

Id. at 1375–76 (quoting PhotoCure ASA v. Dudas, 622 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(citing Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1990), aff’d sub nom.
PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Burgess, supra note 102, at 20.
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PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.
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See id. at 1376–77.
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Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Lupin Pharm., Inc., 603 F.3d 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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Id. A racemate is a mixture consisting of equal amounts of molecules known as enantiomers,
which share the same chemical composition but are mirror images of each other. Despite their shared
chemical composition, enantiomers and racemates may produce different physical, chemical, or
biological properties. See INT’L UNION OF PURE & APPLIED CHEMISTRY, supra note 10, at 1223.
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Ortho–McNeil, 603 F.3d at 1378–79.
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Id. at 1379 (discussing the FDA’s recommendation to the PTO that “[o]ur records also indicate
that [levofloxacin] represents the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the product, as defined
under 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(1), and interpreted by the [appellate and district] courts in [Glaxo]”).
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Id.
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Id. at 1380 (quoting Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 399 (Fed. Cir. 1990))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Lupin argued on appeal that since an enantiomer is half of its racemate,
levofloxacin was present as an “active ingredient” in the previously
marketed racemate ofloxacin.183 According to Lupin, levofloxacin should be
considered the same “drug product.”184 Furthermore, since ofloxacin was
already available on the market, Ortho’s application to market levofloxacin
did not satisfy “the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the
product” requisite of § 156.185 The Federal Circuit was not persuaded,
however, that the enantiomer’s presence within the already marketed
mixture disqualified it from a term extension, emphasizing its separate
patentability and regulatory testing requirements.186 Echoing PhotoCure, the
court affirmed the grant of Ortho’s application.187
Together, PhotoCure and Ortho–McNeil represent a shift from the
prior inconsistent treatment of highly related compounds by the Federal
Circuit to a more predictable management of these products in a patentextension context. This consistency is certainly not undesirable.188 However,
facilitating patent extensions by interpreting “product” to refer only to the
approved formulation of a broader underlying active moiety is contrary to
the greater harmonizing purposes of the Hatch–Waxman Act.189 These
rulings, and the trend they espouse, encourage patentees to apply to extend
patent terms on new drug compounds despite their shared “chemical,
biological, or pharmacological properties” with previously patented and
approved drug products, “even if the drug candidates are related as
polymorphs, protected forms, and different stereoisomeric combinations of
a previously patented and approved product.”190
While the patent-term-extension provision was intended to be a boon
for branded pharmaceutical companies, to be balanced out by the safe
harbor provision and 180-day exclusivity measure allotted to generics,
interpreting its terms to expansively facilitate extensions transforms it into a
windfall for branded companies. The Federal Circuit should abandon its
current trend interpreting “product” so narrowly as to allow highly related
compounds to gain individual extensions, and return to its previous line of
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1382.
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See, e.g., Burgess, supra note 102, at 26 (lamenting the “legal uncertain[ty]” of the product
debate, which “may result in even greater litigation in a field already plagued with patent litigation”).
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H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48.
190
Warren, supra note 12, at 3; see also Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating
Hatch–Waxman Issues During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 247 (1999) (“A
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reasoning reining in extensions in better furtherance of the Hatch–Waxman
Act’s harmonizing goals.191
V. THE “GAMING” OF THE PATENT SYSTEM BY BRANDED
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
In addition to threatening the balance between pioneer and generic
companies the Hatch–Waxman Act aims to create, the shift in the treatment
of related drug compounds in Ortho–McNeil and PhotoCure represents a
new opportunity for major pharmaceutical companies to “game” the system.
While overall the Hatch–Waxman Act is considered to successfully foster
greater competition in the pharmaceutical industry while maintaining a high
level of innovation, both pioneer and generic drug manufacturers have
worked to circumvent the provisions they find unsympathetic, ultimately
decreasing the availability of low-cost generics to the public.192 With
disingenuous and anticompetitive incentives already being fostered, albeit
inadvertently, by certain provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act, major
pharmaceutical companies are hardly in need of another legislative loophole
to exploit.193 A return to the Federal Circuit’s previous treatment of related
compounds is necessary to foster a more beneficial balance between the
incentive to innovate and consumer protection, and thus foreclose another
opportunity for potential gaming of the patent system.
As Senator Schumer stated in a 2001 Senate hearing: “[T]he balance
[of the Hatch–Waxman Act] has been thrown out of whack in recent years.
The large pharmaceutical companies basically have been playing by their
own rules. As the stakes and profits have become higher, lawyers for that
industry have picked the Hatch–Waxman law clean.”194 There are a number
of popular strategies employed by brand-name pharmaceutical companies
under the Hatch–Waxman regime to extend their patent lifetimes that abide
by the letter of the statute but not its spirit.195 Examples include companies
seeking to extend patents through manipulation of legislative loopholes and
lobbying,196 through initiating litigation alleging patent infringement, and
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See, e.g., Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 100–01 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff’s
arguments that “product” should be read to mean only the approved formulation of an active ingredient,
rather than its underlying active moiety).
192
Soehnge, supra note 3, at 51.
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See id. at 70.
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Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 99, at 7 (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Schumer, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary).
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See Wirz, supra note 5, at 4 (“Patent protection is meant to reward innovation and research.
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Glasgow, supra note 55, at 237 (referring to proposed legislation aggressively supported by
Claritin manufacturer Schering–Plough through lobbying efforts as the “Claritin Monopoly Relief Act”).
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through strategic temporal layering of patents over different aspects of one
drug product.197
Perhaps the most egregious of these tactics is the reverse-settlement
phenomenon, a practice that has garnered much attention from the Federal
Trade Commission in recent years as it has grown in popularity with drug
companies.198 Reverse-settlement payment agreements are essentially
anticompetitive settlements in which the generic Paragraph IV winner
refrains from entering the market and triggering the 180-day exclusivity
period in exchange for a hefty settlement from the branded company whose
patented product it seeks to imitate.199 Because a single 180-day period can
realize significant profits for the pioneer, it is often worth the branded
company’s while to compensate the generic generously to maintain a few
more months of exclusivity since “[the generic] will not make as much as
the pioneer will lose.”200
Thus, reverse payments are technically effective settlement tools since
they do achieve peace between the respective generic and branded parties.
But there are also “potential negative consequences that extend beyond the
immediate parties involved” and which accrue to the American consumer,
whose access to lower-cost generic alternatives is delayed.201 The Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003202 seeks to
reduce the threat of these anticompetitive settlements by requiring “pioneer
and generic firms to notify the FTC and Department of Justice within 10
days of any agreements involving the 180-day exclusivity period,”203 and
additionally requiring that generics must “exploit their exclusivity period
within certain time limits or risk forfeiture of their reward.”204
Further manipulations of Hatch–Waxman provisions can be found in
the practice of strategically layering patents and in the authorized generic
market. Temporally layering patents over different aspects of a single drug
is a common tool branded pharmaceutical companies use to extend the
patent lifetime of a product.205 Such layering ensures that with the expiration
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of one patent over a drug, another feature’s patent protection triggers and
prevents the drug from going off-patent.206
Authorized generics are brand-name drugs sold under generic labels,
manufactured by the brand but marketed and sold by the generic company
during their period of 180-day exclusivity. A source of much controversy,
courts have reluctantly allowed the sale of authorized generics because
there is no statutory provision prohibiting them since the Hatch–Waxman
Act only restricts other generic manufacturers during the 180-day
exclusivity period.207 Because the authorized generics are priced like
generics, they allow the brand-name company to compete in both markets.
As a result, brand-name companies that manufacture authorized generics
are criticized for manipulating the 180-day provision in an attempt to
discourage generics from pursuing Paragraph IV entry.208 However, the
ultimate legality of this practice of branded manufacturers remains unclear
and continues to be challenged by generic companies.209
The application of the Hatch–Waxman provisions has therefore, at
times, “turn[ed] the [A]ct on its head,” creating an environment in which
anticompetitive agreements and strategic maneuvering of intellectual
property are encouraged and rewarded.210 While patent protection is
certainly of unparalleled importance in the pharmaceutical industry due to
the economic incentive it provides to counter research-and-development
costs,211 the inherent difficulties of the industry do not excuse manipulation
of the legislation meant to balance its concerns with those of the public.
Vigilant policing of the Hatch–Waxman provisions by the courts is
necessary to prevent further “gaming” of the system by pharmaceutical
companies in search of profit. The patent-term-extension provision of § 156
is no exception: it should be interpreted according to the Federal Circuit’s
previous line of reasoning defining “product” in such a way as to rein in
patent extensions, thus continuing to encourage generic competition in the
industry.
CONCLUSION
The Hatch–Waxman Act was designed with the interests of the
branded drug manufacturer, the generic counterpart, and the consumer in
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mind.212 By providing generics with a simplified route to market and
economic incentives to successfully challenge weak drug patents, the Act
ensures consumer access to lower cost alternatives to branded drugs.
Simultaneously, the Act restores patent life lost to branded companies
because of regulatory testing to ensure the economic drive behind
innovation remains strong.213 While the Act has generally been successful in
maintaining a workable balance between these competing entities,
prompting tremendous increases in generic market share while still
promoting a high level of pioneer research and development, that balance
has been threatened by branded entities’ manipulation.214 Scrutiny of the
recent developments in patent-term-extension case law is warranted, as it
could have positive effects on the larger Hatch–Waxman balance.
The PhotoCure and Ortho–McNeil decisions signal a shift in an
inconsistent history of the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the term drug
“product” for purposes of patent-term-extension analysis. A continuation of
this current trend of facilitating extensions signals dangerous consequences
for an already strained pharmaceutical patent system and should be
abandoned for the Federal Circuit’s previous line of reasoning defining
“product” more broadly so as to limit term extensions.215
The Patent Term Extension statute, 35 U.S.C. § 156, was created with
the aim of restoring a portion of the patent life and bolstering the economic
incentive for the development of new drugs, lost during the often lengthy
period of regulatory review.216 Given the broader harmonizing goals of the
Hatch–Waxman Act regarding generic and pioneer companies, it seems
unlikely that Congress intended to provide pioneers with another means to
block generic market entry by allowing highly related compounds to gain
respective term extensions as different “products.”
With the Hatch–Waxman Act’s provisions already being distorted
from their original harmonizing purpose through such tactics as reverse
payments, patent layering, and authorized generics, the Federal Circuit
should tighten term-extension grants to ensure major pharmaceutical
companies cannot abuse another provision to their benefit.217 A possible, if
improbable, solution outside of the judicial process may lie in the provision
of increased funding to the FDA to expedite the regulatory process in the
212
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Soehnge, supra note 3, at 53 (stating the Hatch–Waxman provisions benefit pioneer drug
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first place.218 However, such a remedy would address only the symptom of
the underlying tension between generic and pioneer interests motivating
such “gaming” of the system. Conversely, amending the Hatch–Waxman
Act itself should also be approached with caution, as the Act has been
generally successful and any legislative tinkering “risk[s] triggering the law
of unintended consequences, which could . . . result in less research or
fewer generic drugs.”219 For these reasons, a return to the Federal Circuit’s
previous narrow treatment of related compounds limiting extensions is the
most feasible means to foster a more beneficial balance between the
incentive to innovate and consumer protection with the least disturbance to
the current patent regime.
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